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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 
1. SYMBOLIC CONTROL INC. V. IBM: ELIMINATING AF-




Symbolic Control Inc. v. International Business Machines 
Corp. l is necessarily a tilting at windmills story. Anybody v. 
IBM is a tilting at windmills story, and the antitrust enterprise, 
from a private plaintiff's view (or that of its counsel) is a fairly 
quixotic endeavor. The chances of a recovery are small, the jour-
ney to treble damages is hard and long, often illusory, and full of 
traps, pitfalls, detours and wrong ways, not to mention rich and 
powerful adversaries. Nevertheless, once in a while the national 
policy of the antitrust laws, furthering competitive markets, is 
eff~cted by a private recovery, and once in a while such an 
award survives appeal. Symbolic Control has not yet made it, 
but this term's opinion by the Ninth Circuit, which reaffirms an 
important policy principle in private antitrust law, will help 
significantly. 
Symbolic faced an affirmative defense upon which mM pre-
vailed at trial as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit reversed, 
* Member of the Bar of the State of California; B.A. st. John's College, 1968; J.D. 
University of Chicago Law School, 1971. This Note owes much to the creative and ana-
lytic thought of the senior litigator for plaintiff in Symbolic Control Inc. v. International 
Business Macks., John H. Boone, Esq., of San Francisco, to whom the author is grateful 
for both his conceptual clarity and encouragement over the years, and also for the privi-
lege of second· chairing the trial in Symbolic Control with him. 
1. [1980] Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 63,427 (9th Cir. July, 1980) (per Browning, J.; the 
other panel members were Kennedy, J., and Dumbauld, D.J., sitting by designation), 
amended, Nov. 19, 1980, rehearing denied, Nov. 24, 1980, rev'g, [1976] Trade Cas ... 
60,723 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (per ZirpoIi, J.) (While the Ninth Circuit Survey was at the 
printer, Symbolic Control Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp. was published 
in 643 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1980». 
241 
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denying the affirmative defense as a matter of law, and re· 
manded for a new trial. The reversal has significance not only to 
understanding the proper role of affirmative defenses in private 
treble damage actions, but also for the antitrust bar, Congress, 
and the courts in the continuing struggle with the so· called 
"passing-on" defense, which most recently manifested itself in 
Illinois Brick v. Illinois2 and a series of proposed bills in Con-
gress to overrule it. S 
If to seek private redress for antitrust injury is indeed a 
quixotic quest, and tr·eble damages in reality all too often turn to 
be the same sort of mirage that so often bedeviled Don Quixote, 
the private plaintiffs' bar, like Don Quixote, nonetheless contin-
ues to ride on to new adventures. One purpose of this Note is to 
make that ride a little easier, and the goal a little more sure, by 
suggesting a general principle inhering in several leading cases, 
and illustrated by Symbolic Control, namely: Affirmative de-
fenses have no place in private treble damage actions, by reason 
of the national policy in favor of effective enforcement of the 
antitrust laws. In Symbolic Control, the Ninth Circuit held that 
an affirmative defense analogous to assumption of risk (namely, 
that injury from "ante-natal" violations, pre· dating the business 
existence of the plaintiff, escapes private redress) provides no 
bar to the private plaintiff's recovery. So, too, have other affirm-
ative defenses been read out of the antitrust laws, and so too 
should they all be. :Moreover, application of this principle inci-
dentally solves the symmetry dilemma4 that so trQubled the Su-
preme Court in Illinois Brick, and denial of the "passing·on" 
2. 431 u.S. 720 (1977); see generally P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW, § 
337(a)-(g) (2d ed. 1978); Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing 
to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 
46 U. CHIC. L. REv. 602 (1979). 
3. E.g., H.R. 8359 & 8516-17, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977); H.R. 2060 (the Rodino 
bill), 2204 (the McClory bill), & Representative Butler's unnumbered civil penalty draft 
bill, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977); S. 300, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1978); see also Note, Treble Damages and the Indirect Purchaser Problem: 
Considerations for Congressional Overturning of Illinois Brick, 39 OH. ST. L. J. 545 
(1978). 
4. The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick stated, "we conclude that whatever rule is 
adopted regarding pass-on in antitrust damage actions, it must apply equally to plaintiffs 
and defendants .... " 431 U.S. at 728. This Note respectfully suggests that this conclu-
sion of the Court was exactly wrong by reason of the Court's consistent policy stance 
over the years in favor of recovery against antitrust violators to further the competitive 
goals of the antitrust laws. 
2
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defense to promote recoveries need not require any symmetrical 
limit of privity to deny recoveries to other plaintiffs. 
An Historical Excursus 
The antitrust plaintiff's bar need not lose heart that their 
endeavor is so quixotic, because Don Quixote de la Mancha him-
self was the first trust buster. Shortly after joisting the wind-
mills, the good Don came upon an army of knights with whom 
he did battle (to Sancho Panza's horror because all he could see 
was a vast flock of migrating sheep).15 All the sheep in Spain, 
however - between two and seven million of them - belonged 
to one giant wool monopoly, the Mesta,6 which annually mi-
grated them North to South. The Mesta abused its monopoly 
powers and privileges, riding roughshod 9ver farmers' lands and 
through town squares, and one of its herds, on the Eastern sheep 
route known as the "highway 'de la Mancha,'" was a suitable 
adversary for trust busting, albeit somewhat muddled, in the 
fashion of the knight Don Quixote. (He killed seven sheep when 
all was said and done.) Perhaps the present day antitrust plain-
tiffs' bar simply has Mestas of its own to contend with, mM for 
example, one hopes somewhat more effectively than did Don 
Quixote. 
Facts and Law in Symbolic Control 
The Symbolic Control case involved a type of computer 
program ("software") commonly called "APT" (an acronym for 
Automatically Programmed Tools).'1 An APT computer program 
or "APT Processor" is used with a computer (sometimes called 
"hardware") to allow a machine tool parts programmer to pre-
pare from engineering drawings an operating type for numeri-
cally controlled ("NC") machine· tools ("NCMT"). A numeri-
5. CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE, Bit. I, Ch. XVIII at 170 (Signet ed. 1964). 
6. See J. KLEIN, THE MESTA, A STUDY IN SPANISH ECONOMIC HISTORY passim 
(Harvard ed. 1920). Klein noted Don Quixote's encounter with a Mesta flock on the 
sheep highway de la Mancha. ld. at 19 n.2. Mesta abuses, particularly during the migra-
tions, frequently gave rise to litigation. ld. at 21 n.2. Klein reported estimates (which he 
doubts) of as many as seven million sheep in the Mesta flocks, in the approximate period 
of Don Quixote's attack on the vast ovine army before him. 
The author is indebted to Ruth E. Carsch, Consulting Information Specialist, for 
finding Professor Klein's most informative study. 
7. Brief for Appellant, Symbolic Control Inc. v. International Business Machs., 
[1980] Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 63,427 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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cally controlled machine tool is an automatic milling machine, 
drill, or lathe which will automatically cut or manufacture a 
piece of metal into the variously shaped parts used in the manu-
facture of airplanes, automobiles, or other products. The instruc-
tions are fed into the numerically controlled machine tool in the 
form of a paper control tape. It is in the preparation of this con-
trol tape that the assistance of a computer is essential. Prepara-
tion of these numerical control tapes starts with an individual 
part programmer, who is given an engineering drawing of the 
par:t;icular automobile, airplane, missile, or manufacturing part 
to be milled or lathed. From this drawing the part programmer 
writes a part program, which is a set of instructions which de-
scribe the tool motions to make the part. In writing the part 
program the part programmer uses a special computer language 
called the APT language, an English-like language like FOR-
TRAN or COBOL which can be understood by a computer. 
The part program is then put on a tape, card or disk and 
fed into a computer" The computer then uses an APT processor 
to calculate, in five axes, the precise location, speed and move-
ment of the NCMT machine tool at every moment in the manu-
facture of the particular part desired~ 
Historically, the first APT processor was developed by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology pursuant to a contract 
with the United States Air Force. This basic APT processor was 
continuously modified for uses in the aerospace industry by the 
Aerospace Industries Association, and for a time, administered 
by the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute 
("IITRI"). 
, In the period after March, 1967, the most popular computer 
used for APT was the IBM System 360. The System 360 was a 
large and very expensive computer and many of the potential 
users of the System 360 were manufacturing companies which 
used computers for, among other things, APT processing. 
An enthusiastic beneficiary of these developments, the 
Chairman of North American Rockwell, was quoted by IBM as 
saying: "The marriage of Numerical Control, the digital com-
puter, and machine tools is one of the stunning technological in-
novations of our time. An achievement to rank with nuclear 
4
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power and with space flight as a third great development of our 
generation. "8 
In order to secure this computer business, mM on March 
31, 1967, offered an APT processor, called "NC 360," to replace 
IITRI's processor "APT III." An APT processor is one of the 
most complex computer programs ever written. It must be con-
stantly improved in order for it to be used by manufacturing 
companies. Thus a large support staff is necessary to maintain 
the commercial viability of an APT processor, which mM also 
supplied. 
The court of appeals summarized the facts leading to the 
litigation: 
Between 1967 and 1970, mM developed and 
distributed four versions of its APT processor, all 
designed for use with its System 360 computer 
. . . mM furnished all versions of the NC 360 
program free of charge, and provided free mainte-
nance and modification levels . . . 
Symbolic was incorporated in March, 1969, 
for the purpose of selling an APT processor to be 
known as APT/70 .•. In January, 1971, Sym-
bolic released a processor designed to be used 
only with mM's System/360 computers . . . 
Symbolic sued mM, alleging violations of 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act . . . The 
theory of Symbolic's case was that, because of the 
importance of software in general and APT 
processors in particular to the sale of the large 
computers, mM had a policy of giving the com-
puter program, documentation, instructions to 
use the program, and maintenance of the program 
free of charge to computer users. Symbolic 
charged that this practice was illegal predatory 
pricing for the purpose of monopolizing the 
software market." 
Symbolic Control contended1o that it had provided the only 
8. Trial Record at 46, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2241, Symbolic Control Inc. v. Interna-
tional Business Machs., [1976] Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 60,723 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
9. [1980] Trade Cas. (CCH) at 11 76,240. 
10. Brief for Appellant at 10, Symbolic Control Inc. v. International Business 
Macha., [1980] Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 63,427 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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real NC software competition for IBM hardware users, and that 
the record contained a good deal of testimony proving that 
APT /70 presented very stiff competition for IBM's NC 360. 
IBM's 360 was, however, bundled with its hardware and "free," 
and continually improved and maintained. Symbolic Control 
contended that by this practice IBM intended to, and did ex-
clude Symbolic Control and "capture the market," and Symbolic 
Control put into evidence a classic Sherman Act § 2 intent docu-
ment, authored by IBM's marketing manager in 1971: 
The N Ie strategy of this group was to cap-
ture the N Ie marketplace within an allowable 
budget ($300,000 per year). To do this sound 
management decisions were made . . . . 
In conclusion, the competency of the N Ie de-
velopment group and its strategy to capture the 
N Ie highly competitive market has done just 
that and IBM is currently number one. This 
group has created and is protecting on a world-
wide basis over $300,000,000 of hardware drag 
along since 1969 to present. This was done with a 
budget of around $300,000 per year (around one 
percent).l1 
The district court denied a pretrial motion by IBM for sum-
mary judgment but ordered a bifurcated trial to be directed only 
to "the issue as to whether plaintiff's business sustained legally 
cognizable impact by reason of act[s] of ffiM." The district 
court purported to BlSsume for the purposes of trial that there 
was a violation of the antitrust laws. 
The court of appeals summarized the result below: 
At the close of Symbolic's evidence, the dis-
trict court dismissed the suit against ffiM, hold-
ing that the controlling evidence concerning im-
pact of the alleged violation was tesimony by 
users of ffiM's NC 360. These customers were the 
potential users of APT /70. The court held that 
evidence of possible consequences of ffiM's pric-
ing the pro{,rram, rather than giving it away, was 
irrelevant, because such evidence would be specu-
11. Quoting Trial Record at 3, 7, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2241, Symbolic Control, Inc. v. 
International Business Machs., [1980] Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 63,427 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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lative and that pricing would not have been possi-
ble after mM placed its various versions of NC 
360 in the public' domain. [mM's "ante-natal" 
conduct.] Relying on this analysis, the court 
found that there was no impact on Symbolic's 
business, since user testimony revealed that price 
was not, to them, a relevant factor in the decision 
to use one product or the other. IS 
247 
The court of appeals then explored the trial court's error: 
The theory of Symbolic'S case was that mM 
had foreclosed competition in a product line. The 
court assumed a violation had occurred, but 
found that it did not cause the losses sustained by 
Symbolic. Yet, if the assumed violation consists of 
mM's giving away a discrete product line in order 
to bar a potential entrant from competing with 
the line, it is difficult to assume anything but ad-
verse competitive effects . . . .13 
The court of appeals then dealt with the trial court's faulty 
analysis of the question of price, or mM's lack of price. This 
zero price, according to the trial court, did no cognizable injury 
to Symbolic Control because mM had already started to price 
its software for free before Symbolic Control's incorporation. On 
the issue of the fact of injury, the court of appeals found the 
trial court's analysis circular: 
The court's ruling was based, moreover, on 
the apparent premise of a demand for mM's 
product that was impervious to price considera-
tion. It assumes the very question in issue to ar-
gue that a product has been accepted over a com-
peting product because of superior quality if the 
analysis is made wholly without reference to 
price.14 
Inasmuch as the district court's bifurcation of violation and in-
jury issues had led it into the errors elucidated by the court of 
appeals, the court of appeals reversed. Fundamental to the re-
versal was the court of appeals' analysis of the assumption of 
risk or "ante-natal" conduct defense, because the district court 
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had accepted IBM's counsel's erroneous proposition that such 
an affirmative defense could deny recovery to an actually-injured 
antitrust plaintiff, injured by proven violations. IBM's trial 
counsel had insisted that the date of the plaintiff's entry into 
business (for example, before or after the inception of the viola-
tions) controlled on the issue of liability, citing Buckeye Power 
Co. v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours Power CO.lIS 
The district court had made the following statement in a 
footnote to its opiniol1: . 
The Court assumes, as it must for the pur-
poses of this phase of the trial, that there was a 
violation of the antitrust laws. But this assump-
tion in no way relieves plaintiff of the affirmative 
burden of proving that an act prohibited by stat-
ute which injured plaintiff's business or property 
was committed during the period of plaintiff's ex-
istence. Buckeye Power Co. v. du Pont Power Co., 
248 U.S. 55 (1918). Hence while evidence of pre-
1969 conduct may have limited probative value in 
interpreting the actions of ffiM during the post-
1969 period (the period of plaintiff's existence), 
only post-1969 acts may be considered in deter-
mining whether plaintiff's business or property 
sustained legally cognizable impact by reason of 
such acts of ffiM."lll 
This footnote, although appearing in the published opinion, 
was later stricken by the district COurt17 "to avoid confusion," 
with respect to acts prohibited by statute, inasmuch as violation 
was to be assumed. Judge Zirpoli did not, however, change his 
basic premise that only post-1969 conduct could be considered, 
although he did say that the acts of IBM "regardless of their 
nature" had no impact on Symbolic Control.18 Despite this 
15. 248 U.S. 55 (1918). 
16. [1976] Trade Cas. (CCH) at 11 60,723 n.3. 
17. The district court struck its footnote 3 in its Order Denying Motion for a New 
Trial filed June 25, 1976. Clerk's Record at 1176, Symbolic Control Inc. v. International 
Business Macha., [1976] Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 60,723 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
18. [d. Some months aiter the filing of the trial court's memorandum decision, 
Judge Zirpoli again reiterated his enoneous acceptance of ffiM's affirmative defense, 
during the argument on Symbolic Control's motion for a new triaL 
The question of impact or injury is strictly a fact question. I 
do not interpret it as a legal question. The only legal question 
that arises is: Must the injury occur as the result of an act of 
8
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statement, the court did not amend its opinion and continued to 
require "proving injury from acts of defendant during the rele-
vant period." 
The Buckeye case, upon which IBM and the trial court so 
heavily relied, arose from a judgment for the defendant where 
one of the plaintiff's exceptions to jury instructions was: 
The Judge remarked in his charge that the 
plaintiff did not stand like a competitor that had 
been in existence while the defendant's influence 
was being developed, and that had been injured 
in its business during the course of such develop-
ment, - that the mere existence of the defen-
dant's power as it was when the plaintiff was born 
was not in itself a cause of action to the plaintiff, 
but that the plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant uses its power oppressively, if not against 
the plaintiff, at least in the course of defendant's 
business. 111 
The Supreme Court said that the exception "seems to us 
over critical" and that the Judge's remarks were "innocuous 
truth." Justice Holmes then indicated, "The plaintiff could not 
be called into being in order to maintain a suit for conduct that 
made it not pay to be born. Claims for such antenatal detri-
ments are not much favored by the law."20 
This tort principle, depending on the nature of the tort 
often denominated as "assumption of risk" or "consent," con-
trols because the law does not permit one to see a tort violation 
and then put oneself in a position where a tort cause of action 
will arise, conferring such benefits as litigation may provide. In 
the words of the Restatement of Torts, "A person of full capac-
ity who freely and without fraud or mistake manifests to another 
the defendant in the course of the business existence of the . 
plaintiff? I'm still convinced that it has to be an act within 
the course of the business existence of the plaintiff • • . . 
Trial Transcript at 40, Symbolic Control Inc. v. International Business Machs., [1976] 
Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 60,723 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (emphasis added). Even ffiM's counsel 
backed oft' their position in the court of appeals, Brief for Appellee at 21 ft'., Symbolic 
Control v. International Business Machs., [1980] Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 64,427 (~ Cir. 
1980), in a discussion characterized by the court of appeals as "obscure." Symbolic Con-
trol Inc., [1980] Trade Cas. (CCH) at 11 76,242. 
19. 248 U.S. at 63-64. 
20. Id. at 64. 
9
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assent to the conduct of the other is not entitled to maintain an 
action of tort for harm resulting from such conduct."21 But even 
general tort law does not always recognize such a defense where 
a statute is involved. As Professor Prosser has noted, "If the de-
fendant's act is a crime, affecting the interest of the public, the 
criminal law in many cases refused to recognize the consent of 
the injured party as a defense,"22 and so too for the law of torts, 
according to Prosser. 
The district court, however, erred most fundamentally in re-
lying on Buckeye to dispose of Symbolic Control's case on pre-
1969 conduct because to the extent that the district court read 
Buckeye as adopting a defense of assumption of risk or consent 
in antitrust law, it's holding was contrary to antitrust policy as 
shown by Supreme Court cases involving analogous tort de-
fenses. (Moreover, thE~ Supreme Court itself impliedly overruled 
Justice HoImes' dictum in Buckeye about antenatal acts, in 
Simpson v. Union Oil CO.,28 as noted below.) 
The district court's incorrect view of the law, accepting Jus-
tice HoImes' dictum on antenatal detriments as controlling, led 
to most of that trial court's other errors, because ffiM argued 
successfully to the trial court that having given away the NC 360 
program for free before Symbolic Control tried to sell its com-
peting APT/70, any violation was "antenatal," and Symbolic 
Control had, therefore, assumed any risk of injury in connection 
with ffiM's violations. Thus, in the trial court's view, ffiM's zero 
price for NC 360 could not lead to legally cognizable injury. In-
deed, the trial court so held in the footnote to its first opinion 
quoted above, which it struck after the motion for a new trial, 
but upon whose theory it continued to rely in its decision. 
The court of appeals gave short shrift to ffiM's assumption 
of risk argument, although the panel did not explain the casual 
connection between the trial court accepting the defense, and 
the procedural and substantive errors which the court of appeals 
had to reverse: 
Both the plaintiff and the defendant, as well 
21. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 892. 
22. W. PROSSER, TORTS, § 18, at 107 (4th ed. 1971). 
23. 377 U.S. 13 (1964), rev'g 311 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963). 
10
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as the trial court, spent much time and effort 
grappling with the concepts of "ante-natal viola-
tion" and "assumption of risk"; these concepts 
were thought to derive from the early Sherman 
Act case of Buckeye Powder Company v. E. I. du 
Pont de Nemours Powder Company . .• but ... 
that case has no connection with Symbolic's suit 
against mM. The plaintiff in Buckeye did not 
rely on any 'ante-natal violations' because, as the 
trial judge instructed the jury: "[a]t the time of 
the organization of the plaintiff company, . . . 
and during the entire time the plaintiff carried on 
its business, [the defendant] was acting in viola-
tion of the Antitrust Act as attempting to monop-
olize the trade in powder, which subjected it to be 
dissolved as such by direct attack on the part of 
the United States government." ... Justice 
Holmes' 'ante-natal' dictum is a characteristic 
aphorism but has no bearing on his sound analy-
sis, which did no more than state the obvious pro-
position that monoply power gives no private 
right of action unless used oppressively against a 
plaintiff to its detriment. The antenatal violation 
issue has even less bearing on the case before US.24 
251 
The court of appeals then, in its own footnote, disposed of the 
trial court's reliance on Buckeye: 
We cannot therefore accept the trial court's 
interpretation of Buckeye, that "an act prohibited 
by statute which injured plaintiff's business or 
property [muSt be] committed during the period 
of plaintiff's business [sic: existence]" as a prereq-
uisite to recovery. This statement is not sup-
ported by Buckeye in any way, and is far too 
sweeping in any event. An obvious counter-exam-
ple might be a patent that is fraudulently pro-
curred by defendant before plaintiff's corporate 
existence, but in effect during its existence.25 
The court of appeals continued, in the heart of its opinion: 
It is not clear what significance the trial 
24. [1980] Trade Cas. (CCH) at 1111 76,241-42 (quoting Buckeye Powder Co. v. E. I. 
du Pont de Nemours Powder Co., 223 F. 881, 887 (3d Cir. 1915) (citations omitted). 
25. ld. at 1176,242 (footnote 2 as published, renumbered footnote 4 by order of Nov. 
19, 1980, see note 1 supra). 
11
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court's comments have that 'plaintiff knew,' 
before entering business, about this or that aspect 
of mM's marketing. See Symbolic Control Inc., 
supra, [1976-1] (CCH) Tr. Cas. at 68,098. Sym-
bolic's knowledge of mM's alleged misdeeds is ir-
relevant . . . . Even if Symbolic were brought 
into existence in circumstances where it was prob-
able that it would be entitled to sue by reason of 
competitive injury, this alone has nothing to do 
with its right to recover as long as the three-fold 
requirements of violation, impact, and measure of 
damages are met."1 
ThUs, given fulfillment of the requirements of the three-fold 
test of antitrust liability/n no affirmative defense of assumption 
of risk or its like will bar an antitrust treble' damage recovery in 
the Ninth Circuit. This rule is consistent with, and furthers, the 
national antitrust poliley favoring a treble damage recovery to 
any person actually injured by an antitrust violation, irrespec-
tive of technical defen13es. The disfavor in which affirmative de-
fenses are held in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court cer-
tainly augers well for the fate of the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Symbolic Control, should it go up 'on certiorari. Rehearing en 
banc has already been denied.28 
B. AFFIRMATIVE DEF1~NSES ARE DISFAVORED IN PRIVATE ANTI-
TRUST CASES TO FURTHER NATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCE-
MENT POLICY 
Because of the importance of private enforcement of the an-
titrust laws, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have con-
sistently disfavored aflCirmative defenses in antitrust cases. If the 
private plaintiff can make the three-fold case of violation, fact of 
injury, and measure of damages, it is entitled to recover free of 
the bar of some affirmative defense that would permit a wrong-
doer to evade just reparations on some technical grounds. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit in Simpson v. Union Oil CO.,29 
26. ld. at 11 76,242. 
27. C{. Radiant Burners v. People's Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961) 
("to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under that section, allegations ade-
quate to show a violation and, in a private treble damage action, that plaintiff was dam-
aged thereby are all the law :requires."). 
28. See note 1 supra. 
29. 311 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963). 
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before it saw the light, in effect allowed an assumption of risk 
defense to a guilty antitrust defendant, and was promptly re-
versed,30 there being no good policy reason to permit technical 
defenses to profit wrongdoers with retention of their proverbial 
"ill-gotten gains." 
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court have con-
sistently recognized that private enforcement of the antitrust 
laws implements national antitrust policy, as of course, have the 
academic commentators.31 In separate opinions, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has said, for example, "The provision for the recovery of 
treble damages by an injured party was an important and signif-
icant feature of the entire antitrust program;"32 and "[t]he 
treble-damage action was intended not merely to redress injury 
to an individual through the prohibited practices, but to aid in 
achieving the broad social object of the statute. "33 
The Supreme Court has similarly said, "It is clear that Con-
gress intended to use private self-interest as a means of enforce-
ment . . . when it gave to any injured party a private cause of 
action ... ,"M and "[T]he purpose of giving private parties 
treble damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to pro-
vide private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of 
enforcing the antitrust laws. "315 
Indeed, the antitrust bar itself has joined the Ninth Circuit 
and the Supreme Court in stressing the importance of private 
enforcement. In a comprehensive review of the federal antitrust 
laws, the historic Report of the Attorney General's National 
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws s'f:ated: 
In addition to proceedings by the Depart-
ment [of Justice] and [the Federal] Trade Com-
mission, private suits aid antitrust enforcement. 
The private antitrust suit blends antitrust policy 
with private compensatory law: on the one hand, 
as one Clayton Act proponent put it, such suits 
30. 377 U.S. 13 (1977). 
31. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANnTRUST LAW, § 331 at 149-50 (2d ed. 
1978). 
32. Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1963). 
33. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955). 
34. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947). 
35. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969). 
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aim to enlist "the business public . . . as allies of 
the Government in enforcing the antitrust laws;" 
Such proce1edings have a vital role to play in 
aiding understa.ffed Government agencies to en-
force antitrust prohibitions throughout the 
Nation.ss 
This policy of encouraging private antitrust enforcement 
has played a substantial role in the decisions of the courts of 
appeals and the Supreme Court, and thus affirmative defenses in 
antitrust cases have fared ill. For example, in a case involving 
the affirmative defense of res judicata, the Supreme Court said: 
There is n.o merit, therefore, in the respon-
dents' contenti.on that petitioners are precluded 
by their failure in the 1942 suit to press their de-
mand for injwlctive relief. Particularly is this so 
in view of the public interest in vigilant enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws through the instrwnen-
tality of the pldvate treble-damage action.s7 
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,ss 
the Supreme Court rejected the affirmative defense of "pass-on," 
citing the importance of retaining the effectiveness of private 
antitrust enforcement. As the Court noted, if a passing-on de-
fense was allowed, "those who violate the antitrust laws by price 
fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their illegality 
because no one was available who would bring suit against them. 
Treble damage actions, the importance of which the Court has 
many times emphasized, would be substantially reduced in 
effectiveness. "S9 
Similarly, in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International 
Parts Corp.,"o wherein the court of appeals had held that in pari 
delicto was a defense to a private action, the Supreme Court, in 
reversing, said; "[b]ecause these rulings by the Court of Appeals 
seemed to threaten the effectiveness of the private action as a 
vital means for enforcing the antitrust policy of the United 
36. REPORT OF THE ATTOllNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAws 378-80.(1955) (citing 51 CONGo REc. 16319 (1914». 
37. Lawlor v. National Screen Servo Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1954). 
38. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
39. Id. at 494. 
40. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
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States, we granted certiorari. "n 
A corollary of this policy of encouraging private antitrust 
enforcement has been that the courts should not limit the effi-
cacy of this policy through strict judicial construction and court-
imposed limitations on the right of recovery. In Radovich v. Na-
tional Football League,42 the Supreme Court, in overruling ob-
jections to the sufficiency of the complaint, stated: 
Congress has, by legislative fiat, determined 
that such prohibited activities are injurious to the 
public and has provided sanctions allowing pri-
vate enforcement of the antitrust laws by an ag-
grieved party. These laws protect the victims of 
the forbidden practices as well as the public. Fur-
thermore, Congress itself has placed the private 
antitrust litigant in a most favorable position 
through the enactment of § 5 of the Clayton Act. 
In the face of such a policy this Court should not 
add requirements to burden the private litigant 
beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress 
in those laws:'8 
Similarly, in holding that settlement sums were to be de-
ducted from the treble and not the single damages, the Ninth 
Circuit said: 
The private antitrust action is an important and 
effective method of combatting unlawful and de-
structive business practices. The private suitor 
complements the Government in enforcing the 
antitrust laws. The treble damage provision was 
designed to foster and stimulate the interest of 
private persons in maintaining a free and compet-
itive economy. Its efficacy should not be weak-
ened by judicial constructions.44 
As another example of this policy implemented, the Su-
preme Court has limited the role that even the affirmative de-
fense of the congressionally enacted statute of limitations may 
play in antitrust cases. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
41. [d. at 136. 
42. 352 U.s. 445 (1957). 
43. [d. at 453-54 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
44. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir. 1954). Accord, Hydrolevel 
Corp. v. American Soc'y Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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search, Inc.,.'£> the only issue was whether a plaintiff had been 
injured within the four years, irrespective of how long ago the 
acts took place. Since Zenith, an antitrust defendant cannot 
plead that the statute of limitations has run on violative acts if 
injury by reason of those acts has accrued within the limitations 
period, only recently permitting the measure of damages. With-
out citing Zenith, the Ninth Circuit in Symbolic Control applied 
the ratio decidendi of Zenith to the claim of "ante-natal" viola-
tion as a defense, and held that the fact of injury, rather than 
the date of initial violation, determines liability, and thus explic-
itly eliminated yet another would-be affirmative defense to a 
treble-damage cause of action. 
C. Illinois Brick: Tm~ PASSING-ON DEFENSE AND A FEARFUL 
LOVE OF SYMMETRY 
The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick reaffirmed its holding 
and reasoning in Hanover Shoe that a plaintiff having passed on 
an illegal overcharge is no defense in a treble damage action. 
Unfortunately, from tbe point of view of effective antitrust· en-
forcement, the Court in Illinois Brick thought that mere symme-
try required that, in the absence of the passing-on defense, only 
a plaintiff purchasing directly from the antitrust wrongdoers 
should have the right to sue. In other words, the Court returned 
privity, or rather lack of privity, to the diminishing stable of an-
titrust affirmative defenses. The Court expressed concern about 
double recovery and the like, but the thrust of the decision was 
that it was simply failr (and required by stare decisis) to deny 
any plaintiffs but direct or first purchasers the right to sue if the 
Court had already, as it had, denied defe~dants the affirmative 
defense of passing-on against first purchasers. 
To use Yeats' phrase, it was indeed a fearful love of symme-
try that led to this perverse result. This symmetry permits the 
escape of antitrust wrongdoers whenever no direct purchaser 
chooses to sue. First purchasers have every disincentive to $ue, 
inasmuch as they generally prefer to do business with their sup-
pliers as suppliers rather than litigate with them as defen-
dants!6 Of course, the Supreme Court evidently believed that 
45. 401 U.S. 321 (1971). 
46. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 8359 before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Com-
mercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Congo 1st Sess. 166, 171 (1977) 
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such disincentives would be overcome by establishing only first 
purchasers as bounty hunters,4'1 entitled to all of the illegal over-
charge trebled, whether or not they in fact passed-on any or all 
of the illegal overcharge. The reality of the disincentives facing 
first purchasers, and the effectiveness of state attorneys general 
as private treble damage plaintiffs, albeit usually as last pur-
chasers, went unmeasured by the Court. 
In its prior jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has forth-
rightly denied to antitrust wrongdoers affirmative defenses, and 
indeed, in Illinois Brick, the Court reiterated this result, specifi-
cally with respect to the troublesome defense of passing-on. No 
cry of "fairness for defendants" had deflected the Court from 
the national policy of effective enforcement of the antitrust laws 
by means of the private action. Yet, in Illinois Brick, this sup-
posed fairness became a rule of decision likely to emasculate pri-
vate enforcement, particularly by denying the role of the states 
in the large industry-wide price :fixing cases, the prosecution of 
which often require significant resources. No antitrust wrong-
doer should benefit from this sort of "fairness" which undercuts 
such a fundamen~ national policy.48 It is fair to dEmyan affirm-
ative defense to particular sorts of wrongdoers for particular pol-
icy reasons; no issue of fundamental fairness or due process 
arises, because the protections of due process are afforded in the 
initial determinations of wrongdoing. All that is at issue is who 
. shall have redress, including the statutory treble and exemplary 
damages. With respect to this issue, the Supreme Court (as well 
as this circuit) has long held that affirmative defenses sha'll not 
provide a technical bar to redress against such proven wrongdo-
ers. Such wrongdoers having no right to plead affirmative de-
fenses in bar, so much less so should some fancied symmetry 
between plaintiffs and defendants in effect provide a resurrected 
affirmative defense of "absence of privity"49 to proven antitrust 
wrongdoers. Plaintiffs and defendants no more deserve "equal" 
treatment in substantive rules of law than do hangmen and 
(statement of Josef D. Cooper, Esq.). 
47. Compare Hearings on H.R. 2060 and H.R. 2204 and Other Proposals Restoring 
Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and 
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Congo 1st Sess. 258, 345 
(1979) (testimony of Bartholomew Lee) [hereinafter cited as Lee testimony]. 
48. Lee testimony, supra note 47, at 259-60. 
49. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), thought to have been the 
death knell for absence of privity as a defense. 
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felons, because it is exactly because of particular substantive 
rules of law that particular parties find themselves plaintiffs and 
defendants. The Supreme Court has simply resuscitated a long 
dead affirmative defense-privity-because it ten years ago de-
nied defendants the related affirmative defense of passing-on. 
Such symmetry exactly misses the point often made by the 
Court in other contexts, and implemented by the Ninth Circuit 
in Symbolic Control: If a plaintiff proves violation, fact of in-
jury, and measure of damages, the plaintiff recovers free of tech-
nical defenses that permit the escape of proven violators. The 
Ninth Circuit decision in Symbolic Control reaffirms the princi-
ple that affirmative defenses have no place in private antitrust 
cases. This principle, otherwise honored and indeed instituted 
by the Supreme Court, should have been applied by the Court in 
Illinois Brick exactly SIS it was by the Ninth Circuit in In re 
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases,GO on the indirect purchaser's 
right to sue. Instead of demonstrating its love of symmetry, the 
Court could and should have stood on principle, and let any 
plaintiff, injured in fact, have standing to sue, while preserving 
the rule of Hanover Shoe that no defendant may assert passing-
on as a defense. Any number of devices are available to avoid 
the assumed evils of double recovery; for example, that the first 
plaintiff to judgment take the full recovery, would be a salutory 
rule in these days of protracted cases.G1 The courts, and Con-
gress, could easily work out such devices for any real difficul-
ties.G2 Yet, what has happened has been the sacrifice of princi-
50. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); the Ninth Circuit 
held: 
The antitrust laws are to be construed so as to achieve the 
broad goals which Congress intended to effectuate. Fred 
Meyer, Inc., .•• 390 U.S. [341,] 349, 88 S. Ct. 904. One such 
policy goal is that there be no hiatus in the enforcement of 
these laws. See Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International 
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 136, 138, 88 S. Ct. 1981, 20 L. Ed. 
2d 982 (1968). Each individual who is injured may sue. Hawaii 
v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 405 U.S. 251, 263, 92 S. Ct. 885, 
31 L. Ed. 2d 18<1 (1972). Thus, while we should not impose 
multiple liability upon defendants, nor give recovery to unin-
jured plaintiffs, neither should we bar recovery to those who 
can demonstrate that they bore the burden of the violation. 
487 F.2d at 200. 
51. See Lee testimony, silpra note 47, at 260; P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANrrrRUST 
LAW § 337 n.4 (2d ed. 1978), independently arrive at this proposal. 
52. See P. AREEDA & D. rl'URNER, II ANrrrRUST LAw, § 337(f) (2d ed. 1978). In In re 
Western Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 201 (9th Cir. 1973), the court stated: 
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pIe, and policy, in the name of symmetry. The rule of the Ninth 
Circuit in Symbolic Control that only the three-fold test of vio-
lation, fact of injury, and measure of damages need be satisfied 
for recovery is a rule that requires an opposite result in Illinois 
Brick, and one which obviates mere symmetry as a rule of law. 
Between policy and symmetry, the courts, however high, should 
opt for policy. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Affirmative defenses are barriers with no place in the pri-
vate plaintiffs' road to an antitrust -recovery. Congress, having 
It is urged that our decision for appellants would result in re-
quiring appellees to twice pay treble damages. As we have 
said, the amount of the overcharge is not subject to double 
payment, because appellees' liability in that regard is to be 
apportioned after the amount of the overcharge is fixed. Fur-
ther, each plaintiff (including appellants), be he intermediary 
or ultimate consumer, will be awarded only such further dam-
ages, including lost profits, as he may reasonably prove alloca-
ble to him. 
We therefore see no problem of double recovery, and we 
believe that if this difficulty should arise in some other con-
nection, the district court will be able to fashion relief accord-
ingly. In addition to the court's control over its decree, numer-
ous devices exist. We note that the consolidation of cases, 
which has already occurred, is one means of averting duplici-
tous awards. The short, four-year statute of limitations is an-
other; later suits, after final judgment herein, are unlikely. 15 
U.S.C. § 15b. In other cases, it may be that statutory inter-
pleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, could be used by antitrust defen-
dants to avoid double liability. If necessary, special masters 
may be appointed to handle complex cases. Finally, there are 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and proce-
dures for compulsory joinder. The day is long past when 
courts, particularly federal courts, will deny relief to a deserv-
ing plaintiff merely because of procedural difficulties or 
problems of apportioning damages. 
Given Illinois Brick, the Ninth Circuit perhaps spoke this last a bit too soon. Read-
ing between the lines, the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick seems to have been persuaded 
that such good intentions had gone awry, and that the first purchaser to last purchaser 
industry antitrust cases simply created too much exposure to defendants. The essence of 
the argument is that the antitrust laws should not be played as a judicial game of "you 
bet your company". See 431 U.S. at 747 n.3I. (citing Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation 
- Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976). It is, however, company 
managements which decide which risks to take, well counseled by corporation lawyers, 
and as Mr. Dooley once said: "What t' you and me looks like a brick wall, t' a corpora-
tion lawyer can look like a triumphal arch." 
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seen fit to provide the incentive of treble damages, has expressed 
the national policy in favor of private enforcement so often em-
phasized by the SupreIlle Court, and reaffirmed by the Ninth 
Circuit in Symbolic Control. However quixotic the private plain-
tiff's quest may be, a plaintiff should be entitled to a trial (by 
jury if not by combat) free of such artificial roadblocks as affirm-
ative defenses, because such a plaintiff furthers a national p~licy 
in favor of competitive markets by his very existence. "Ante-na-
tal" conduct should no m.ore be a defense to an antitrust wrong-
doer than should be "absence of privity." The purpose of the 
treble damage provisions of the Clayton Act is obviously to deter 
wrongdoing as well as to induce the wronged to sue, and any 
affirmative defense simply undercuts the congressional purpose 
to provide effective and workable sanctions against non-competi-
tive business conduct. Affirmative defenses have no more place 
in antitrust law than do anticompetitive practices in the market 
place, when such anticompetitive practices, price-fixing and the 
like, the antitrust laws were enacted to eliminate. As the Ninth 
Circuit implicitly recognized in Symbolic Control, affirmative 
defenses in antitrust cases can only foster anticompetitive con-
duct. The law is well rid of them. 
II. THE DEMISE Olli' MANDAMUS GUIDELINES IN THE 
NINTH CIRCUrr 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Discretionary use of writs of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit 
was recently expanded by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Varsic v. United States District Court.l Recognizing that the 
petitioner might be denied his chance to pursue the merits of his 
cause of action becauBe of a lack of the financial means neces-
sary to present his claim. in New York, Justice Wallace vacated a 
change of venue order and retained jurisdiction in the United 
States District Court for the Central District of California. 
While the immediate effect of this decision may be favorable, 
the ramifications of expanding the use of mandamus based on 
the problems of individual petitioners are inconsistent with the 
1. 607 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were Hug, 
J., and Solomon, D. J., sitting by designation). 
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purpose and scope of mandamus relief. 
B. FACTS 
John Varsic filed an action against the Amalgamated Insur-
ance Fund, its Board of Trustees, and its Administrator,2 claim-
ing that he was denied pension benefits to which he was entitled 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA).3 Varsic sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary 
relief on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. Because 
of his limited income,4 Varsic was allowed to proceed in the 
United States District Court in forma pauperis. 
The Fund moved for dismissal, and alternatively, for a 
transfer to the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, arguing that venue did not properly lie in 
the Central District of California. Ii The defendants claimed the 
ERISA venue provisions was intended to require an action under 
the Act to be brought in the Fund's district of residence.'1 The 
district court judge agreed with the defendants' narrow con-
struction of the ERISA venue provision and granted the Defen-
dants' motion for a transfer to New York. 
Varsic petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for 
relief on a writ of mandamus. The appellate court granted his 
petition. 
C. DECISION AND RATIONALE OF THE COURT 
In granting Varsie's petition" for a writ of mandamus, the 
2. Hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Fund." 
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976). 
4. The court noted that Varsic's sole source of income was his social security entitle-
ment. 607 F.2d at 252. 
5. This motion was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976), which states that: 
"[tlhe district court of a district in which is rued a case laying venue in the wrong divi-
sion of district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any 
district or division in which it could have been brought." 
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (1976) states: 
Where an action under this subchapter is brought in a district 
court of the United States, it may be brought where the plan 
is administered, where the breach took place, or where a de-
fendant resides or may be found, and process may be served in 
any other district where a defendant resides or may be found. 
7. "The Fund urges an interpretation of this section [29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (1976)] 
such that all four roads would lead exclusively to its home office." 607 F.2d at 248. 
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Ninth Circuit decided both that the district court's transfer 
order was erroneous as a matter of law and that the circum-
stances of this case warranted extraordinary relief. 
In order to find that mandamus should issue to correct the 
district court's error, the court of appeals used the analysis 
promulgated in Bauman v. United States District Court.9 In 
Bauman, the court of appeals refused to modify a class action 
certification because there were no extraordinary circumstances 
of the type necessary to justify the discretionary use of an ex-
.traordinary remedy such as mandamus. The Bauman court set 
up five guidelines for determining when extraordinary circum-
stances necessitate the issuance of a writ of mandamus: 1) the 
party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as di-
rect appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires; 2) the peti-
tioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on 
appeal; 3) the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a 
matter of law; 4) the dlistrict court's order is an oft-repeated er-
ror, or manifests a pel~sistent disregard of the federal rules; 5) 
the district court's order raises new and important problems, or 
issues of law of first impression.lo 
Applying the Bauman test to a change of venue motion, the 
court of appeals determined that, although the circumstances in 
the Varsic case did not comply with all of the Bauman guide-
lines, mandamus should lie. The court pointed out that the 
Bauman guidelines are not to be used as strict requirementS for 
mandamus, but rather should be used in a balancing fashion to 
determine the propriety of issuing mandamus in a given 
situation. 
The court viewed the irremediable, extraordinary hardship 
that a transfer to New York would place on Varsic as weighing 
heavily in his favor.H Regardless of whether the district court's 
S. The court of appeals determined that if personal jurisdiction could be properly 
asserted over the Fund, it could be "found" in the Central District of California in com-
pliance with the ERISA venue provision. 
9. 557 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1977). 
10. Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977). 
11. The court took into consideration the fact that Varsic's sole source of income 
was his social security entitlement. Moreover, the court noted that Varsic was permitted 
to proceed in district court ill forma pauperis and was represented by counsel from the 
Legal Servs. Corp., 607 F.2d at 252. 
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order may be reversed on later appeal to the Second Circuit, a 
favorable decision on appeal would not cure the burden placed 
on Varsic by the district court's transfer order. This is exactly 
the type of situation in which mandamus is viewed as the appro-
priate remedy by the Ninth Circuit.12 
D. DISCUSSION 
Background of Writ of Mandamus 
A court of appeals has the power to issue a writ of manda-
mus in appropriate circumstances by authority of the All Writs 
Act.1s Mandamus has been traditionally used to correct lower 
court errors in jurisdiction. If Where a district court has over-
reached its jurisdictional limitations or failed to assert jurisdic-
tion over an action clearly within its scope, traditional manda-
mus willlie.l15 Courts have also employed writs of mandamus to 
correct orders which show a clear abuse of judicial discretion 
which amounts to a "usurpation of power" by the district 
court.16 
12. "Indeed, the very nature of the prejudice which we tind material in part (2) of 
the Bauman test, applies with great force to part (1) as to the adequacy of any relief 
which is available to Varsic without mandamus." ld. 
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976) states: 
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by act of 
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of 
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law. 
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice 
or judge of a court which has jurisdiction. 
14. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (writ of mandamus issued to prevent im-
proper jurisdiction from being asserted over a foreign vessel). 
15. In Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n., 319 U.S. 21 (1943), the Supreme Court 
stated that: 
[t]he traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction 
both at common law and in the federal courts has been to con-
tine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed ju-
risdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its 
duty to do so. 
ld. at 26 (citations omitted). 
16. DeBeers ConsoL Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945). The Supreme 
Court vacated injunctions sequestering foreign assets where the lower court had no stat-
utory authority to take such action. See also, Bankers' Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 
U.S. 349 (1953), where the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's denial of a peti-
tion for writ of mandamus on the grounds that such a writ should not be used as a 
substitute for an interlocutory appeal but only to correct abuses of judicial power. 
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The Supreme Court has interpreted the All Writs ActI '1 to 
authorize supervisory mandamus powers in the federal courts of 
appeal.IS This expanded reading of the Act allows discretionary 
review of erroneous lower court orders not associated with the 
power or jurisdiction of the district court. This supervisory 
power is premised on the fact that the 'exceptional circum-
stances' surrounding an abuse of discretion by the district court 
necessitates the use of mandamus in order to ensure proper judi-
cial administration within the federal system.I9 
In 1964, the Supreme Court again broadened the scope of 
mandamus by allowing mandamus to be used to settle important 
questions of first impression. In the case of Schlagenhauf v. 
Holder,20 the Supreme Court invoked a new type of advisory 
mandamus to explain the proper construction of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 35.:U Mandamus was determined to be the 
proper tool for interpreting rules formulated and enforced by 
the courts.22 
The Traditional Use of Mandamus in the Ninth Circuit 
In accordance with the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the All Writs Act,23 the Ninth Circuit views mandamus as an 
extraordinary remedy to be reserved for extraordinary situa-
tions.24 Mandamus will not be granted if there is any possibility 
that the petitioner's grievance can be rectified on appeal.215 This 
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). See note 13 supra for the text of the statute. 
18. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (affirming issuance of a writ of 
mandamus preventing a district court from referring an anti-trust case to a master). See 
generally, Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 
HARv. L. REV. 595 (1973). 
19. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., Inc., 352 U.S. 259 (1957). 
20. 379 U.S. 104 (1964). 
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 35 allows a court to compel a party in an action in which the 
mental or physical condition of that party is in controversy to submit to a physical or 
mental examination by a physician. 
22. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112 (1964). 
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (19'/6). See note 13 supra for the text of statute. 
24. See Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947); Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 
U.S. 394 (1976); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976); 
Southern Cal. Theatre Owners' Assoc. v. United States Dist. Court, 530 F.2d 955 (9th 
Cir. 1970); Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Court 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961). 
25. In denying a writ of mandamus to vacate a change of venue order, the court of 
appeals stated: "The remedy of appeal from a final judgment is 'inadequate' so as to 
justify the use of mandamus only when it is totally unavailable, or when because of the 
particular circumstances, it could not correct extraordinary hardship." Gulf Research & 
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policy of refusing to employ mandamus as a substitute for inter-
locutory appeals stems from the court's desire to discourage 
piecemeal appellate review. "[IJn an era of excessively crowded 
lower court dockets, it is in the interest of the fair and prompt 
administration of justice to discourage piecemeal litigation. "26 
Mandamus has been used by the Ninth C£cuit in both 
traditional and supervisory situations. Traditional uses include 
cases where the district judge has acted in a manner which 
amounts to a usurpation of power or where the district judge 
incorrectly invoked or failed to invoke jurisdiction.27 The Ninth 
Circuit has invoked supervisory mandamus power where a dis-
trict judge has made an error in discretion which would result in 
a severe miscarriage of justice if not corrected by mandamus. 
Usurpation of power by a district court has been deemed to 
justify mandamus since unauthorized actions of the district 
court cannot be remedied on appeal.28 This is not a case of im-
proper resolution of an issue properly before the court, but 
rather an improper use of judicial control which must be pre-
vented by extraordinary relief.29 
Failure of the district court to invoke its jurisdiction has 
Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 185 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1950). See also Hartley Pen Co. v. United 
States Dist. Court, 287 F.2d 324, 328 (9th Cir. 1950), where the court of appeals stated: 
"In our view the remedy is available in an ordinary case within our jurisdiction if ordi-
nary remedies are inadequate and there are present exceptional circumstances which re-
quire the issuance of an extraordinary writ to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." 
26. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976), aff'g 511 F.2d 192 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (petition for writ of mandamus to vacate two discovery orders denied because 
claim of confidentiality was not properly made and petitioners had other avenues of re-
lief available to them). See also Belfer v. Pence, 435 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1970), where the 
court of appeals refused to issue mandamus to vacate a discovery order against non-
parties, finding that there was no evil not correctable on appeal. 
27. Bankers' Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953); DeBeers Consolo 
Mines, Ltd. V. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n., 319 
U.S. 21 (1943). 
28. Pan Am. World Airway, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (writ of mandamus granted to prevent district judge from notifying potential 
plaintiffs in an airplane crash of actions already pending, since such notice was not ex-
plicitly authorized by statute or rule). 
29. Hartland V. Alaska Airlines, 544 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1976) (where district court 
judge ordered petitioners' lawyers to pay a percentage of settlement on a wrongful death 
claim which had not yet been med into a fund to be used for attorneys fees for all ac-
tions arising from the same air crash, held that this usurpation of judicial power clearly 
warranted extraordinary relief). 
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arisen most frequently ill change of venue situations. Review by 
the appellate court of a clearly erroneous transfer order through 
the use of mandamus hIllS been found to be a proper exercise of 
the court of appeals' mandamus power.lIO The rationale behind 
the use of mandamus here is that an improper transfer of an 
action to another district will often frustrate the appellate power 
of the circuit court.lI1 For example, if an action were improperly 
transferred from California to New York, the Second Circuit 
would have appellate review power at the end of the trial over 
the transfer order madl8 by a district judge in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.lI2 To prevent this confused process of review, the Ninth Cir-
cuit will deal with the propriety of transfer orders through the 
use of mandamus. 
The Ninth Circuit will also issue mandamus to compel a 
change of venue transfer if the denial of such a transfer is 
"clearly erroneous."88 The Ninth Circuit has determined that 
since the purpose of a change of venue order is to "avoid the 
disruption, expense, and inconvenience parties and witnesses 
must suffer by having the trial in an improper forum,"84 failure 
to rectify an erroneous denial of a transfer motion would be un-
correctable by appeal and, therefore, must be remedied by 
mandamus. 
Supervisory Mandamus in the Ninth Circuit 
What is sufficient to constitute a clear abuse of discretion 
necessary to invoke supervisory mandamus has not been pre-
cisely defined by the Ninth Circuit. Erroneous class certifica-
30. In Commercial Lighting Prod., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 537 F.2d 1078 
(9th Cir. 1976), the court set a.side a transfer order to another district where the action 
could not have been originally brought, saying: "[m]andamus will lie to review 8 clearly 
erroneous transfer order entered under section 1404(8)." ld. at 1079. 
31. Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 185 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1950) ("the 
writ will issue to compel an inferior court to proceed in an action which properly invokes 
that court's jurisdiction in order to prevent the inferior court, by inaction, from frustrat-
ing the legitimate appellate jurisdiction of this court."). 
32. Magnetic Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1950) 
("The review of any order of the district court in a transferred cause made before trans-
fer, is within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals of the circuit to which the cause has 
been transferred .••. "). 
33. In Pacific Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 951-52 (9th Cir. 1968), the 
Court of appeals stated: "This court, in line with the rule in most other circuits will, 
however, review on mandamus clearly erroneous orders entered under section 1404(a)." 
34. Pacific Car & Founru:y Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 1968). 
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tion, S5 improper discovery orders,36 and irrational transfer or-
derss7 have all been held by the court of appeals to be possible 
sitautions warranting mandamus relief. However, the Ninth Cir.,. 
cuit will generally not use mandamus to correct a district court's 
error in discretion unless extraordinary circumstances are ex-
pressly demonstrated by the petitioner.38 
Mandamus after Bauman v. United States District Court 
In Bauman the Ninth Circuit clarified the term 'extraordi-
nary circumstances' by establishing guidelines for when a writ of 
mandamus should issue.s9 The court held that "[aJs with many 
other facets of judicial power, the continuing effectiveness of an 
appellate court's section 1651 power depends on its reasoned 
and principled exercise."fo Recognizing the dangers of issuing 
writs too frequently,41 the court attempted to make the criteria 
for issuance of writs of mandamus more concrete and workable. 
35. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083 (9th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976) the court of appeals stated that: "[w]hile 
erroneous class action certifications may rarely be corrected by mandamus. • ., the certi-
fication in this case constitutes a clear abuse of discretion sufficient to invoke this ex-
traordinary writ •.•• " ld. at 1087 (emphasis added). Bauman v. United States Dist. 
Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusal to modify a class certification by means of a 
writ of mandamus). Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (refusal to annul a class action certification). 
36. Guerra v. Board of Trustees, 567 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1977) (ready availability of 
alternatives to mandamus to protect petitioners' confidential files justify denial of writ to 
vacate discovery orders); Southern Cal. Theatre Owners Ass'n v. United States Dist. 
Court, 430 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 1970) (denial of petition to vacate discovery orders 
because petitioner could have sought protective orders instead) ("[mJandamus to review 
discovery orders is an extraordinary remedy which issues only in very unusual circum-
stances or to correct an immediate and irreparable injury."). 
37. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 538 F.2d 1371, 1375 
(9th Cir. 1976) (writ vacating a transfer of a cross-claim to the Court of Claims not war-
ranted because it could not be concluded that there was "no rational and substantial 
legal argument in support of the district court's decision"). 
38. In Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 185 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1950), the court 
of appeals refused to vacate a § 1406 change of venue order on the grounds that no 
particular hardship had been shown. Since the corporate litigants did not demonstrate 
that it would be any more expensive or burdensome to try the case in the Third Circuit 
than in the Ninth Circuit, mandamus relief was denied. 
39. Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977). 
40. ld. at 654. 
41. The Bauman court identified three specific dangers inherent in issuing writs of 
mandamus: 1) the subversion of the policies underlying the finality rule or the limita-
tions on interlocutory appeals, 2) the undermining of mutual respect between the federal 
and appellate courts, and 3) the issuance of writs based on sympathy rather than reason 
and principle. ld. at 653-54. 
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Although Varsic -is the first case to apply the Bauman 
guidelines to a change of venue order, the Ninth Circuit has pre-
viously used the Bauman analysis in other fact situations. Fo-
cusing on the first prong of the Bauman test;'2 the court of ap-
peals refused to vacate a discovery order in Guerra v. Board of 
Trustees,"S saying that the ready availability of alternatives·· to 
mandamus to ensure the confidentiality of documents made 
extraordinary relief Ulmecessary. 
In United States v. Sherman,·5 a criminal case, the court 
issued a writ of mandamus vacating the trial court's bar on in-
terviews of jurors by the press after a verdict had been returned. 
Balancing the Bauman indicators, the court found that manda-
mus should issue there because the petitioners·6 had no other 
adequate means of relief, the petitioners would be damaged in a 
way not correctable on appeal, the district court's order was er-
roneous as a matter of law;''1 and the order raised important 
problems of first amendment law. . 
Mandamus in Other Circuits 
Other circuits are not entirely consistent in the use of man-
damus with the Ninth Circuit. Generally the Second Circuit will 
. issue a writ of mandamus when there has been a usurpation of 
power by the district court, but not for an error in discretion!S 
The Second Circuit does, however, recognize certain situations 
in which supervisory mandamus is appropriate. Where a ques-
42. Id. at 654 ("[T)he party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as 
direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires."). 
43. 567 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1977). 
44. The court cited the use of in camera disclosure, sealing of records, use of as-
sumed names and strict control over copies as examples of alternatives. Id. at 355. 
45. 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978). 
46. The Sherman court first dealt with the issue of whether the press had standing 
to seek a writ of mandamus. The court determined that since the petitioners -had been 
injured in fact by the district judge's order and the injury dealt with the petitioners' 
legally protected zone of interest, the petitioners had standing to seek mandamus relief. 
Id. at 1360 (citing Data Pro<:essing Servo V. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970». 
, 47. The Sherman court held that unless the district court's order could be justified 
by more than protecting jurors from harrassment and preserving their impartiality to 
enable them to serve on future juries, the district court's order was erroneous as a matter 
of law because it interfered with petitioners' first amendment rights. 
48. American Flyers Airline Corp. V. Farrell, 385 F.2d 936, 938 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 390 U.S. 1012 (1967) (denial of writ to compel a change of venue transfer) ("[I)t is 
worthy of note that this court has never in its history granted one of these writs to 
compel a transfer."). 
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tion of law presents an issue capable of general resolution, su-
pervisory mandamus will be used to oversee the proper adminis-
tration of justice within the circuit.49 
The Eighth Circuit employs mandamus to rectify abuses of 
discretionary power by the district courts.ISO However, manda-
mus will only lie in the Eighth Circuit if appellate review is in-
adequate and the order presents questions of substantial impor-
tance to the administration of justice. lSI 
The Tenth Circuit's use of mandamus relief is more akin to 
that of the Ninth Circuit. A writ will issue for a clear abuse of 
discretion, an abdication of judicial function, or the usurpation 
of judicial power under exceptional circumstances.1S2 
E. CRITIQUE 
It is obvious that the court of appeals was faced with a di-
lemma in the Varsic case. Given petitioner's limited financial 
means and the expense of bringing trial in New York, denial of 
the writ would have precluded Varsic from pursuing his claim. 
The court could not, however, ignore the precedent of limiting 
discretionary mandamus relief to extraordinary situations. 
The precedent of reserving mandamus relief for extraordi-
nary circumstances has been firmly established in the Ninth Cir-
cuit since Ex parte Fahey.lSs The recent Bauman decision ap-
peared to clarify the meaning of extraordinary circumstances 
49. International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 
1972) (petition granted to vacate a discovery order in an antitrust suit). 
50. Knight v. Alsop, 535 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1976) (writ granted to compel convening 
of three-judge court in action challenging constitutionality of state statute); Cessna Air-
craft Co. v. Skyways, Inc. 532 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1976) (denial of petition for writ of 
mandamus to compel leave to me cross-claim because trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying permission); White Industries, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 518 F.2d 21 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975) (refusal to issue writ of mandamus to over-
turn class action certification because abuse of judicial discretion not proved). 
51. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Bagley, 601 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1979) (writ of man-
damus granted to partially lift protective order during discovery); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 
456 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1972) (petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate a discovery order 
based on attorney-client privilege granted in part). 
52. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civic Center Theatre, 333 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 
1964) (petition for writ of mandamus to vacate discovery order denied for lack of excep-
tional circumstances); Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
421 U.S. 914 (1975) (mandamus granted to vacate a discovery order). 
53. 332 U.S. 258 (1947). 
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and to provide very practical guidelines for issuance of manda-
mus to correct judicial errors in discretion. 
Justice Wallace did not:find that a usurpation of power ex-
isted that would warrant traditional mandamus relief. Instead, 
he found that Varsic's petition complied with the Bauman 
guidelines. Since Justice Wallace purported to follow the 
Bauman test rather than vacate the district court's order under 
traditional mandamus theory, the effect of Varsic on the 
Bauman test is worthy of consideration. The cases in which the 
Bauman test has been used prior to Varsic demonstrate that 
Bauman was meant to place limits on the discretionary use of 
mandamus. In Guerra, U where there were other possible alter-
natives to employing mandamus, the court did not grant the 
writ. In Sherman, Ii Ii the petitioners had no other possible rem-
edy, since they were not parties to the underlying criminal ac-
tion. The Bauman analysis was easily applicable to each of these 
cases since the first {,ruideline could clearly indicate whether or 
not extraordinary relief was warranted. However, Varsic was not 
as simple. Since an erroneous change of venue order can be 
raised on appeal at the conclusion of the trial, it cannot be said 
that Varsic was totally without a remedy. Yet, if Varsic could 
not afford to litigate his claim in New York, he probably could 
not afford an appeal. Therefore, the only alternative remedy was 
practically foreclosed to this petitioner. 
The first Bauman guideline seems to indicate that any issue 
that can be brought on appeal cannot be reviewed by manda-
mus. However, the second guideline modifies this provision by 
allowing a petitioner to allege that he will be irremediably dam-
aged unless a judicial error is immediately corrected. The Varsic 
court maintained that the Bauman guidelines should be "bal-
anced." Proceeding in this manner, discretionary mandamus re-
lief will not be limited, but rather, will be expanded. A strong 
showing that "the district court's order was erroneous as a mat-
ter of law,"1i6 combined with the contradictory provisions of the 
first two guidelines, will usually tip the balance in favor of grant-
ing mandamus relief, 
54. Guena v. Board of Trustees, 567 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1977). 
55. United States v. Sherman, 501 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978). 
56. Bauman v. United States Diat. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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The ultimate issue thus becomes whether extraordinary re-
lief is available to correct discretionary errors only when the pe-
titioner has no other theoretical remedy or when no other rem-
edy is practical. Justice Wallace focused on the hardship which 
this venue change would place on Varsic as an individual. Grant-
ing that it is probable and unfortunate that Varsic might not be 
able to afford to try his claim in New York, it is surprising that 
the court was willing to modify such strong precedent to suit the 
needs of one individual. We must question whether the court 
would have been as benevolent if the petitioner had not been 
such a sympathetic figure. If this had been a claim by a corpora-
tion or an individual of considerable wealth, it seems very possi-
ble that the outcome might have been different. The balancing 
of the guidelines seems to provide a convenient method of 
manipulating the criteria for mandamus review based upon who 
is the petitioner. If the court is willing to allow such manipula-
tion of the Bauman guidelines, then the guidelines are ineffec: 
tive in limiting the scope of discretionary mandamus review. 
Judith A. Leichtnam* 
III. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE 
In Reiser v. Del Monte Properties Co., 605 F.2d 1135 (9th 
Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit expanded the "common benefit ex-
ception" to the general rule against granting attorneys' fees ab-
sent a statute or a contract. Plaintiff, a director of defendant 
corporation, alleged that the planned merger between defendant 
and another corporation violated section 5 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, and that the proxy statement approved by 
the board of directors was false and misleading in violation of 
the Act. Before the case came to trial, and as a result of plain-
tiff's suit, the board of directors withdrew the proxy statement 
and postponed the meeting on the proposed merger. The case 
was dismissed as moot, and plaintiff refiled a request for attor-
neys' fees. 
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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The court of appeals based its ruling that the grant of attor-
neys' fees was not impermissible as a matter of law on the "com-
mon benefit" exception to the general rule against the grant of 
attorneys' fees. This exception permits the grant of attorneys' 
fees when the plaintiff's actions have resulted in a substantial 
benefit to others. Relying on Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 
307 U.s. 161 (1939), in which the Court stated that the formali-
ties of a trial are not required for the grant of attorneys' fees, 
and Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), which 
held that attorneys' fees could be awarded even when the benefit 
conferred by the plaintiff is non-monetary, the court of appeals 
held that the facts that the case did not proceed to trial and that 
the suit was a private action rather than a shareholder's deriva-
tive suit or representative suit did not preclude the grant of at-
torneys' fees as a matter of law. The court stated that because 
plaintiff's action resulted in substantial benefits to the other 
shareholders, an easily identifiable group, an award of attorneys' 
fees against the corporation would shift the expense of the ac-
tion to the shareholders and thereby prevent their unjust enrich-
ment. The court reasoned that allowing attorneys' fees only if a 
suit was brought representatively or derivatively would defeat 
fundamental, equitable principles, and that the deciding factor 
is whether plaintiff has actually conferred a benefit on others. 
The court also held that the fact that the underlying action 
had become moot did not preclude the grant of attorneys' fees. 
The court relied on Schmidt v. Zazzara, 544 F.2s 412 (9th Cir. 
1976), which held that a court retains jurisdiction over the ques-
tion of whether to grant attorneys' fees after the court has 
entered a final judgment on the underlying suit. 
In Campbell Industries v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24 (9th 
Cir. 1980) plaintiff lretained Torbert as an expert witness in a 
civil suit. Before trial, defense counsel had several ex parte 
meetings with Torbert, and Torbert later agreed to testify on 
behalf of defendant. Defendant moved to take Torbert's deposi-
tion, and the district court denied this motion. The district court 
also issued an order prohibiting Torbert from testifying at trial. 
Although defendant conceded that it's counsel meetings 
with Torbert constituted a violation of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(4), the defendant argued that the district court 
abused its discretion in prohibiting Torbert from testifying. The 
court of appeals upheld the district court. 
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The court of appeals based its decision on the facts that de-
fense counsel's conduct was a flagrant violation of proper discov-
ery procedure, and that prohibiting Tortbert from testifying did 
not prejudice the defendant. The court noted that defendant 
had other expert witnesses available, and that at least one other 
expert did testify to the issues that Torbert would have covered. 
The court emphasized that district courts have broad discretion 
in making discovery rulings and have the inherent power to pre-
vent abuses of discovery. 
In Moittie v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 
1267 (9th Cir. 1980), several private parties filed antitrust ac-
tions against defendant. Plaintiffs' suits against defendant were 
then consolidated with several other actions, and removed to 
federal court. The district court dismissed the suit, in which 
plaintiffs alleged that defendant had violated section 4 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), on the ground that private 
parties· do not have standing to sue under that section of the 
Act. Five of the seven plaintiffs appealed that suit, and, while 
their suit was pending, the Supreme Court held that private par-
ties do have standing to sue under section 4. Reiter v. Sonotone, 
442 U.S. 338 (1979). The five appeals from the earlier suit were 
remanded for holdings consistent with Reiter. 
The plaintiffs in the present case are those two individuals 
who did not appeal the earlier district court decision. Instead, 
they brought suit in state court alleging state antitrust law viola-
tions. The suits were removed to federal court and were held to 
be disguised federal antitrust claims similar to the original fed-
eral claims. The later cases were then dismissed on res judicata 
grounds. Finding that the earlier case had been "effectively re-
versed," the court of appeals held that the present suit should 
not be dismissed on res judicata grounds. 
The court noted that when a case is reversed on appeal, 
only the reversal controls subsequent cases as res judicata. Thus, 
had the plaintiffs chosen to appeal the earlier suit in federal 
court, that decision would have been reversed as to the plain-
tiffs. However, because they had not appealed, the case had 
never been reversed as to them. The court of appeals rejected 
what might be a technically correct result in favor of "common 
sense and simple justice." The court noted that even though the 
first case had not been reversed as to the plaintiffs in the pre-
sent case, it had been reversed in fact. The court also pointed 
33
Lee and Leichtnam: Federal Practice
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
274 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.ll:271 
out that the district court had not reached a judgment on the 
merits, but had merely ruled that all the plaintiffs below lacked 
standing to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act. The court 
ruled that "a hypertechnical application of a judicially created 
rule" should not deny the plaintiffs their day in court. 
In Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1979), 
plaintiff brought suit alleging securities law violations. Plaintiff 
moved for class certification, and when that motion was denied, 
plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that he could not proceed to 
trial because the possible award would be less than the cost of 
pursuing his claim. Plaintiff failed to appear when the case was 
called for trial, and the court ordered the case dismissed for 
want of prosecution. Three days later, the court filed a written 
order dismissing the suit without prejudice. Plaintiff then filed a 
notice of appeal, and defendant filed for a correction of the mo-
tion. In a second written order, the court decreed that the case 
was dismissed with prejudice. 
The court of appeals characterized the lower court's second 
written order as a correction of a clerical mistake persuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 41(b) states that such a dismissal made without qualifica-
tion is a dismissal with prejudice. Thus, in issuing its second 
written order, the lower court was merely correcting its first 
written order to conform to the initial verbal order. The court 
noted, however, that the district court had failed to seek permis-
sion to correct its filrst written order as required -by rule 60(a). 
Analogizing the case to those in which a district court clearly 
intends to dismiss a petition but fails to do so-in which case a 
remand for the purpose of entering an order of dismissal would 
be a mere formality-the court held that the case had been dis-
missed with prejudice. 
In Myers v. United States District Court 624 F.2d 906 (9th 
Cir. 1980) the court of appeals held that an untimely demand for 
a jury trial granted liS a discretionary matter was "in accordance 
with state law" as required by rule 81(c). Plaintiff sued in state 
court, and defendant made an untimely demand for a jury trial. 
The state court granted the jury trial as a matter of discretion. 
The case was later remeved to federal court, and in the order 
setting a trial date in federal district court, the judge specified 
that the trial would be had without a jury. Defense counsel sent 
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the district judge a letter asking if the jury had been eliminated 
as an oversight. The judge's clerk responded with a letter stating 
that defense counsel's letter would be treated as a jury demand 
which would be granted "as a matter of course." Plaintiff at-
tacked defendant's right to a jury and the district judge issued a 
pretrial order that the trial would be had without a jury. Defen-
dant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. 
The court of appeals held that although defendant's de-
mand for a jury was not made in the preferred way of making a 
demand within the ten-day limit prescribed by state law, defen-
dant did seek a jury trial "in accordance with state law," FED. R. 
CIV. P. 81(c), by presenting the state court with evidence per-
suading it that the jury demand should be granted as a matter 
of discretion. The court held that the grant of the jury trial 
under state procedural rules was not reviewable, and a failure to 
make a timely demand for a jury trial in the district court did 
not constitute a waiver of his right to a jury trial. 
In Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), a deriva-
tive action was brought by two minority shareholders of Walt 
Disney Productions against certain members of the board of di-
rectors. The plaintiffs alleged that the organization of a stock 
option plan for key employees was conducted by illegal use of 
inside information by directors to maximize their individual 
profits, and by inadequate disclosure to shareholders of the fed-
eral laws applicable to the option plan. The specific violations 
alleged were Section lOb, Section 10b-5, and Section 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Immediately after the suit was 
filed, Disney's board of directors appointed a "special litigation 
committee," composed of three directors, to determine if pursuit 
of the derivative action was in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. After a series of meetings, the special committee decided 
that the corporate interest would be best served if the action 
were discontinued, and moved for dismissal. The district court 
reasoned that if the special committee utilized its best business 
judgment, then neither the shareholders nor the courts could 
disturb that decision. Thus, the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment was partially granted, and only the issue of 
whether the special committee used good faith in its decision . 
was left for litigation. . 
The minority shareholders appealed and argued that the 
board of directors could not unilaterally bar shareholder at-
tempts to act on behalf of the corporation. Before the case 
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reached the Ninth Circuit Court, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the identical issue in Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 
471 (1979). In that ca'3e, it was held that a special committee of 
disinterested directoru can discontinue derivative actions if (1) 
the applicable state lalw allows it and (2) the state law is consis-
tent with the federal securities laws. This two-step approach was 
followed by the Ninth Circuit in the derivative action against 
Disney Productions. 
Since the California Supreme Court had never addressed 
this issue, the Ninth Circuit was forced to rely on rulings from 
intermediate appellate courts and other jurisdictions in its inter-
pretation of California law. The court began by focusing on the 
business judgment rule as the standard by which directors are 
able to insulate their activities from shareholder attach. Since 
the business judgment rule provides immunity for all discretion-
ary decisions by the directors, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a 
decision by a special litigation committee not to pursue a cause 
of action clearly is within the ambit of this immunity. The cru-
cial authority in support of this finding was a recent Eighth Cir-
cuit decision based o:n a "business judgment" statute similar to 
California's. In Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, (8th 
Cir. 1979), the extension of the business judgment rule to deci-
sions by special litigation committee was recogn~ed. The court 
reasoned that the board of directors must act on behalf of the 
corporation, and appointing a special litigation committee is 
part of that duty. The Ninth Circuit considered its holding to 
"reflect a clear trend in corporate law, and ... that a California 
court would follow this trend." By so holding, the court believed 
that the board of directors could effectively control excessive 
and frivolous claims by dissident shareholders. Conversely, by 
requiring the special litigation committee to act in good faith in 
its decisions, the board of directors would not likely abuse this 
power to the detrimtmt of the shareholders. 
The second detormination required by the Burks decision 
was an assurance that the interpretation of the state law does 
not conflict with the federal securities laws. The court held that 
allowing a special litigation committee appointed by the board 
of directors to dismilJS a lawsuit brought against the corporation 
would not frustrate any policies underlying the federal securities 
laws. The court noted that protecting the purity of the securities 
market (section 10) and the prevention of deceptive proxy solici-
tations (section 14) were the relevant underlying policies in this 
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action. Neither of these policies was found to be frustrated by 
the court's holding in favor of summary judgment. 
In short, the issue turns on the element of good faith. If the 
dismissal is made in bad faith, the shareholders will still be al-
lowed to maintain their derivative action. That issue was re-
served for trial. The two minority shareholders may prevail be-
cause one director on the special litigation committee was also a 
defendant in the derivative action. 
In De Luz Ranchos Inves'tment v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 
60B F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979), the plaintiffs, De Luz, were a 
group of limited partnerships formed to facilitate investment in 
a 97,500-acre parcel of land owned by Kaiser-Aetna (Kaiser). 
The parcel was subdivided into separate tracts, and the plain-
tiffs purchased lots from Kaiser within two of those tracts. 
There were two important factors involved in this sales transac-
tion: 1) the plaintiffs were charged a price in excess of the mar-
ket value, and 2) Kaiser represented to the buyers that it would 
develop common facilities within the planned community. Based 
upon these factors, De Luz charged Kaiser, its representatives, 
and Coldwell Banker with fraud, misrepresentation, and decep-
tive practices; in violation of the federal securities laws and the 
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The district court 
granted Coldwell's motion for summary judgment on the basis of 
the defendants' failure to state a claim. It was held that a land 
sale contract is not subject to the federal securities laws, and 
that the size of the subdivision qualified it as an exemption from 
the provisions of the Land Sales Act. Both of these findings were 
appealed by De Luz. 
On the applicability of the federal securities laws to a land 
sale contract, the plaintiffs contended that their agreement with 
Kaiser was in fact an investment contract, and thereby satisfied 
the definition of a security under 15 U.S.C. section 7Bc(10). The 
court began its analysis by noting that an investment contract is 
generally defined as an agreement to invest money in a common 
enterprise with an expectation of profits solely from the efforts 
of others. The Ninth Circuit in Securities and Exchange Com-
mission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th 
Cir. 1973), modified this test by limiting the "efforts" of others 
to only the essential managerial efforts which affect the failure 
or success of the enterprise. De Luz argued that this standard 
was met because Kaiser promoted the entire development as a 
passive investment designed to appreciate in value, and because 
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Kaiser indicated that it would facilitate any resale efforts. The 
appellate court held that the evidence failed to establish an in-
vestment agreement between the parties in light of the addi-
tional factors. Specificlllly, Kaiser never contractually bound it-
self to develop any land in the development, and De Luz 
maintained the sole control to develop their purchlUled land. 
Furthermore, the parties never extended an agreement to dis-
tribute profits from the development. The court reasoned that 
Kaiser did not provide the "essential managerial efforts" in de-
veloping the property purchased by De Luz, and that the evi-
dence strongly disproved a common enterprise between De Luz 
and Kaiser. While the court admitted that the agreement "lies 
near the fringe of those transactions" that are investment con-
tracts, summary judgm.ent was affirmed. 
De Luz also appealed the district court finding that the 
transaction was exempt from the provisions of the Interstate 
Land Sale Full Disclosure Act. The Act exempts "the sale or 
lease of lots in a subdivision, all of which are five acres or more 
in size." The first dislf>ute arose over the proper definition of a 
subdivision. The defem.dants claimed that each tract within the 
97,500 acre parcel WBlS a subdivision, and because all the lots 
within that tract were larger than five acres, the agreement was 
exempt. De Luz argued that the subdivision was the entire par-
cel, in which some lots are less than five acres in size. The court 
found the relevant subdivision to be the entire development. 
The second dispute arose over whether the exemption for a par-
cel that contains lots "all of which are five acres or more in size" 
applies to the entire subdivision or merely the parcel conveyed. 
If the latter applied, the transaction would be exempt. The court 
reasoned that the Act was designed to prevent fraud in land 
sales, and should therefore be liberally construed. The court 
held that the Act applies to the entire subdivision. The district 
court's grant of summary judgment was reversed. 
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Blazon Corp., 
609 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1979), the defendants, Glenn McMurray 
and Arthur Lloyd, organized the Blazon Corporation in 1972 for 
the purpose of acquiring land for residential development and 
construction. After the initial sixteen acre land purchase ex-
hausted the corporate finances, a public stock offering was or-
ganized. The sale of Blazon stock proceeded under the small is-
sues exemption provided for in section 3(b) of the Securities Act 
and Regulation A promulgated thereunder. Four hundred thou-
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sand shares of common stock were offered at $1.00 per share. 
Pursuant to the small issues exemption the defendants filed a 
notification form with the Commission and prepared an offering 
circular. The circular indicated that Blazon 1) owned the sixteen 
acre tract, 2) intended to purchase an additional twenty-three 
acres with the proceeds from the offering, and 3) planned to al-
locate $230,000 of the offering proceeds to development of the 
sixteen acre plot. 
During the offering period, Blazon engaged in other tranac-
tions that rendered compliance with the objectives in the notice 
circular impossible. Specifically, Blazon purchased a trailer man-
ufacturing factory an4 secured a loan by forfeiting the rights to 
receive 336,500 shares of Blazon stock. Also, Blazon loaned 
$225,000 out of the proceeds of the stock offering to another cor-
poration. Finally, the defendants borrowed $50,000 in order to 
purchase Blazon stock, and pledged a $50,000 certificate of de-
posit purchased by Blazon with offering proceeds as collateral 
for the loan. None of these changes were communicated to the 
Commission, and suit was filed alleging registration and offering 
violations of the federal securities laws. On the registration 
count, summary judgment was granted in favor of Blazon. On 
the offering violation, summary judgment was granted in favor 
of the Commission for Blazon's violation of the antifraud provi-
sions. Both the Commission and the defendants appealed. 
Blazon appealed the fraud count on the grounds that a find-
ing of fraudulent intent was required to establish a violation of 
the antifraud provisions, and that no showing was made before 
the district court. Blazon relied on Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch/elder, 
425 U.S. 185 (1976) as authority that a showing of fraudulent 
intent is needed. However, the court distinguished that case on 
two grounds. First, Ernst & Ernst involved only section lOb and 
Rule 10b-5 violations, whereas section 17 was alleged as an addi-
tional violation against Blazon. The court recognized that fraud-
ulent intent must be shown to bring a section 10 violation, but 
held that a similar showing is not required under section 17. 
Second, the Ernst & Ernst suit was brought by private parties 
for damages, whereas the suit against Blazon was brought for 
injunctive relief. The court found these differences to be signifi-
cant. The court did not require a finding of scienter in an in-
junction case under sections 17(a)(2) and (3). 
The Commission appealed on the grounds that Blazon was 
not exempt from registering their securities. The Commission 
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argued that although the defendants were exempt from registra-
tion under section 3(b) and complied with Regulation A at the 
beginning of their sale, the exemption was lost when the Notifi-
cation to the Commission and the offering circular subsequently 
became false and misl<eading. According to the Commission's ar-
gument, this led to a violation of the Regulation A requirement 
to qualify for section 3(b) exemption. The result, the Commis-
sion contended, was a violation of section 5 of the Securities Act 
(prohibiting the sale of unregistered securities) because the non-
exempt securities were not otherwise registered. The court ana-
lyzed this argument by distinguishing situations in which the 
notification and offering circular are never filed, from those situ-
ations in which the required documents are filed incorrectly. 
The court noted that when the documents are never filed, the 
result is an automatic loss of the registration exemption and 
thereby a section 5 violation. However, the court refused to ex-
tend this to an "incomplete or inadequate filing, or filing which 
becomes incomplete or inadequate." This holding was based on 
rule 261,17 C.F.R. 230.261 (1980). The provisions of this section 
grant the Commission the option to suspend an exemption if af-
ter proper filing, the Commission has reason to believe the noti-
fication or offering circular contain untrue statements. The court 
reasoned that if Bla2:on's exemption were automatically termi-
nated because it became inadequate, then the purpose of rule 
261 would be entirely frustrated. 
The final argumHnt by the Commission concerned the con-
tent of the injunction entered by the district court. The injunc-
tion allowed the deflmdants to move for dissolution of the in-
junction at any time after eighteen months of its issuance. The 
Commission argued that the provision in the injunction was be-
yond the power of the court to include and that it was an abuse 
of discretion to include it. The appellate court dispensed with 
this argument rather easily. The court relied on well recognized 
authority that affords a district court wide discretion in framing 
its injunction. Furthermore, the test for overuling a lower court 
injunction is whether there was a plain abuse of discretion, and 
the evidence did not satisfy that standard. 
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Murphy. 626 
F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980), the defendant, Stephen Murphy, ap-
pealed a district court ruling that granted summary judgment 
against him and the Intertie Company for violating the registra-
tion and antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 
40
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/9
1981] FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 281 
Additionally, the defendant appealled the scope of the court's 
injunction prohibiting future violations. 
In 1971, Murphy formed the Intertie Company for the pur-
pose of promoting and seIling cable vision systems to partner-
ships. The scheme involved the sale of cable vision systems by 
Intertie for cash, nonrecourse promissory notes, and an immedi-
ate leaseback by the buyer to Intertie. Murphy employed the 
International Securities Corporation to sell the partnership in-
terests, but the interests were never registered as securities. 
Murphy's attempt to rely on the private offering exemption of 
the securities laws was rejected by the district court, which 
found that the sale was a public offering because the number of 
offerees was not limited or controlled in any way. Thus, the 
transaction was subject to registration under section 5 of the 
Securities Act. The antifraud provisions (sections 17 and 10 and 
rule 10b-5) were found to be violated because the offering mem-
oranda contained misleading information about the history, per-
formance capability, and financial structure of the Intertie 
Company. 
Registration Violations. On appeal, Murphy argued the re-
gistration laws were inapplicable because the sale of the shares 
in the limited partnership were not securities, and in the alter-
native, because the transaction was protected by the private of-
fering exemption. The appellate court ruled against Murphy on 
both contentions. 
The court relied on Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
Glenn W. Turner, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973) for its definition 
of a security as an investment in a common enterprise with the 
essential managerial efforts coming from persons other than the 
investor. Since the investors had no managerial role in the Inter-
tie Company, the limited partnership interests qualified as 
securities. 
A more involved argument by Murphy was that the transac-
tion should be construed as a private offering. The availability of 
this exemption mainly depends on the relationship between the 
offeree and the issuer of the securities. This case was unique in 
that the identity of the issuer was not apparant. Generally, the 
issuer of a partnership share is the partnership itself. This would 
indicate that the newly formed partnerships were the issuers, 
and not Murphy and the Intertie Company. However, the court 
reasoned that the issuer of securities should be the entity that 1) 
is responsible for the success or failure of the enterprise, and 2) 
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is material to the investors' decision. The evidence showed that 
Intertie participated extensively in the partnership offering plan, 
managed many of the partnerships, and depended on new capi-
tal to meet its obligations on the previous purchases. Thus, the 
court found Intertie to be the issuer because of this involvement 
in the transaction. 
Mer identifying the issuer, Murphy next argued the private 
offering exemption under section 4(2) of the Securities Act. The 
factors involved in this determination are: 1) the number of of-
ferees, 2) the sophistication of the offerees, 3) the size and man-
ner of the offering, an.d 4) the relationship of the offerees to the 
issuer. These factors balanced in favor of a public offering. For 
example, the SEC introduced evidence tending to show that the 
offering was made available to a large number of investors. This 
was indicative of a nonprivate sale especially when the defen-
dant was unable to introduce evidence to the contrary. Also, it 
was found that a majority of the offerees "lacked the sort of bus-
iness acumen necessary to qualify as sophisticated investors." 
Murphy was unable to dispute this point. Additionally, the court 
found the aggregate sale of $7.5 million in securities to be a size-
able offering. Finally, the· court found that the relationship be-
tween the parties was such that the investors were not provided 
with the necessary information needed to make their investment 
decisions. Since the investors composed a group that the securi-
ties laws were designed to protect, Murphy could not success-
fully claim a section 4(2) exemption. 
Murphy also claimed an exemption under rule 146 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations, which provides an exemption when 
the issuer has reasonable grounds to believe that the offeree 
realized the nature of the investment or is able to bear the eco-
nomic risk. The court found that the factors which supported a 
public offering under section 4(2) were applicable in this analy-
sis. Therefore, Murphy had no reasonable grounds to believe 
that the offerees possessed sufficient information without 
registration. 
The final issue for the court was to review Murphy's role in 
the transaction, which must have been significant if he were held 
personally liable under the registration provisions. Although a 
literal reading of section 5 limits the liability to persons who sell 
or offer to sell a security, other participants have also been 
found to be subject to registration. Participant liability has gen-
erally been found if the defendant's conduct proximately caused 
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the harm to the plaintiff, or if "but for" the defendant's involve-
ment the transaction would not have taken place. Since Murphy 
engaged in steps necessary to the distribution, devised the 
corporate financing scheme without which there would have 
been no limited partnerships, prepared the offering memoranda, 
met with broker-dealers, and spoke at broler-dealer seminars, he 
easily satisfied the standard for participant liability. The holding 
by the district court, that Murphy violated the registration pro-
visions of the Securities Act by offering and selling unregistered 
securities, was affirmed. 
Violations of the Antifraud Provisions. Murphy contended 
that the district court erred in finding him liable for securities 
fraud because his omissions were not material and because he 
did not act with scienter. The court rejected the materiality ar-
gument because Murphy neglected to disclose the financial con-
dition, solvency, and profitability of Intertie. The court found "a 
reasonable investor would consider this omitted information im-
portant in making an investment decision." Murphy's scienter 
argument focused on the recent decision in Securities and Ex-
change Commission v. Aaron, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980), which held 
that the SEC could not obtain an injunction for violations of 
section 10(b), rule 10b-5, or section 17(a)(1) absent proof of sci-
enter. Murphy's argument was rejected because the issue pro-
ceeded to trial at the district court, and it was found that Mur-
phy "willfully" and "knowingly" obtained money through 
material misrepresentations. The use of the terms by the district 
court indicated that scienter was found. Additionally, th~ evi-
dence showed that Murphy also violated section 17(a)(2) (ob-
taining money or property by means of an untrue statement of a 
material fact or by omission of a material fact). The court in 
Aaron held that an injunction under this section may be issued 
absent proof of scienter. 
Permanent Injunction Against Registration Violations. 
Murphy claimed that the trial court improperly granted a per-
manent injunction against future violations of the registration 
requirements, and that the breadth of the injunction was an 
abuse of discretion. The standard to be met to obtain a perma-
nent injunction is a showing that there is a reasonable likelihood 
of future violations of the securities laws. This is done by assess-
ing the totality of the circ~stances surrounding the defendant 
and his violations. Murphy contended that his assurances 
against future violations should satisfy the test. The appellate 
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court disagreed. The facts of the case indicated that Murphy 
acted recklessly in violating the registration provisions, and this 
supported a permanent injunction. 
A provision of the injunction required that Murphy furnish 
copies of the court's decree to future associates. Murphy argued 
that this order was punitive in nature. The court relied on well 
recognized authority that allows any injunction if the standards 
of the public interest are served, and held that investors' aware-
ness of matters affecting their investment which came to light in 
the litigation is undoubtedly within the public interest. 
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